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Abstract
We discuss government-leading welfare-improving collusion in a mixed duopoly. We
formulate an innitely repeated game in which a welfare-maximizing rm and a prot-
maximizing rm coexist. The government proposes welfare-improving collusion and this
is sustainable if both rms have incentives to follow it. We compare two competition
structures|Cournot and Bertrand|in this long-run context. We nd that Cournot
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1 Introduction
Collusion among prot-maximizing rms raises prices, and thus, is harmful for consumer
and economic welfare. However, if some rms are concerned with social welfare in the
market, welfare-improving and consumer-beneting collusion may be formed. In this study,
we analyze an innitely repeated game under complete information in a market in which a
welfare-maximizing rm competes with a prot-maximizing rm.1 The government proposes
welfare-improving collusion and this is sustainable if incentive compatibility is satised for
both rms.2 We compare two competition structures|Cournot and Bertrand|in this long-
run context. We nd that Cournot competition (the quantity-setting model) yields greater
welfare when the discount factor is suciently large, whereas Bertrand competition (the
price-setting model) is better when the discount factor is small.
We show that the deviation incentive from welfare-improving collusion (one-shot gain of
deviating from collusion) is greater under Cournot than Bertrand competition, in contrast to
prot-maximizing private collusion. For this eect, it is more dicult for the government to
form welfare-improving collusion under Cournot competition, and this is harmful for welfare.
However, the punishment for the deviation is stricter under Cournot competition, again in
contrast to a private duopoly. This punishment eect makes the collusion more stable.
Therefore, it is easier to form welfare-improving collusion under Cournot competition, and
this is benecial for welfare. The former eect dominates when the discount factor is small,
while the latter eect dominates when the discount factor is large. This leads to the above
result.
In the literature on mixed oligopolies, Cournot{Bertrand comparisons are popular.3
1One natural interpretation of this market is that one rm is a state-owned public rm, which is adopted
in the literature on mixed oligopolies. For the examples of mixed oligopolies and recent development of this
eld, see Ye (2016). Another interpretation is that one rm is concerned with corporate social responsibility
(Ghosh and Mitra, 2014; Matsumura and Ogawa, 2014).
2For the reality of welfare-improving collusion in a mixed oligopoly, see Wen and Sasaki (2001). The
government's intervention in collusion and competition occurs often in Japan and is discussed intensively in
the context of industry policies. See Itoh et al. (1991).
3Another popular topic in the literature is private oligopolies. It is well known that under moderate
conditions, price competition is stronger, yielding lower prots and greater welfare than in the case of quantity
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Ghosh and Mitra (2010), Matsumura and Ogawa (2012), and Haraguchi and Matsumura
(2014) showed that Bertrand competition yields larger prot in the private rm, and Scrim-
itore (2014) and Haraguchi and Matsumura (2016) showed that prot ranking can be re-
versed.4 However, these works showed that Bertrand competition yields greater welfare than
Cournot competition under moderate conditions, whereas our study suggests that Cournot
competition can be better for social welfare. More importantly, no study has discussed this
problem in the context of long-run competition (an innitely repeated game).
While Colombo (2016) discussed an innitely repeated game in a mixed oligopoly, he
discussed prot-maximizing partial collusion among private rms and investigated how the
degree of privatization of the outsider (the public rm) aects the stability of private collu-
sion. Thus, his analysis is completely dierent to ours.5
Wen and Sasaki (2001) is the most closely related to our study. They also discussed
welfare-improving collusion and showed that the public rm's idle capacity stabilizes the
collusion. However, they did not discuss a comparison between Bertrand and Cournot com-
petition.6
2 The Model
We adopt a standard duopoly model with dierentiated goods and linear demand (Dixit,
1979).7 The quasi-linear utility function of the representative consumer is:
U(q0; q1; y) = (q0 + q1)  
2
(q20 + 2q0q1 + q
2
1) + y; (1)
where q0 is the consumption of good 0 produced by the public rm, q1 is the consumption
of good 1 produced by the private rms, and y is the consumption of an outside good that
competition. See Shubik and Levitan (1980) and Vives (1985). However, it is not always true. See Chirco
and Scrimitore (2013). Pal (2014, 2015).
4Nakamura (2015) investigated the bargaining between managers and owners in this context.
5For the discussion on the stability collusion among non-prot-maximizers, see also Matsumura and Mat-
sushima (2012).
6For long-run analysis not based on innitely repeated game in mixed oligopolies, see Ishibashi and Mat-
sumura (2006) and Nishimori and Ogawa (2002, 2005).
7This demand function is popular in the literature on mixed oligopolies. See Barcena-Ruiz (2007), Ishida
and Matsushima (2009), Matsumura and Shimizu (2010), and Haraguchi and Matsumura (2014,2016).
3
is competitively provided, with a unitary price. Parameters  and  are positive constants
and  2 (0; 1) represents the degree of product dierentiation: a smaller  indicates a larger
degree of product dierentiation. The inverse demand functions for goods i = 0; 1 with i 6= j
are
pi =   qi   qj ; (2)
where pi is the price of rm i.
The marginal cost of production is constant for both rms. Let us denote with ci the
marginal cost of rm i, assuming  > ci. Firm 0 is a state-owned public rm whose payo
is the social surplus (welfare). This is given by:
SW = (p0   c0)q0 + (p1   c1)q1 +

(q0 + q1)  (q
2
0 + 2q0q1 + q
2
1)
2
  p0q0   p1q1

: (3)
Firm 1 is a private rm and its payo is its own prot:
1 = (p1   c1)q1: (4)
Firms engage in an innitely repeated game. Let  denote the discount factor between
periods. Along the punishment path, the rms are assumed to use the grim trigger strategy
of Friedman (1971).8
We consider government-leading welfare-improving collusion. The government proposes
a pair of outputs (qC0 ; q
C
1 ) in the quantity competition case and a pair of prices (p
C
0 ; p
C
1 ) in
the price competition case, where the superscript C denotes collusion. Both rms accept the
proposal if it is sustainable in the innitely repeated game under the grim trigger strategy.
8 This punishment strategy is not optimal (Abreu, 1988). We use the grim trigger strategy for simplicity
and tractability. We believe that this is a very realistic punishment strategy because of its simplicity. Many
works adopt this strategy when analyzing stability of agreements. See, among others, Deneckere (1983),
Gibbons (1992), Maggi (1999), Gupta and Venkatu (2002), and Matsumura and Matsushima (2005).
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3 Results
3.1 Bertrand case
First, we consider a competitive situation in which rms face a one-shot game. Let ai :=
  ci. The rst-order conditions of rms 0 and 1 are
@SW
@p0
=
c0   p0   c1 + p1
(1  2) = 0; (5)
@1
@p1
=
c1   2p1 + + p0   
(1  2) = 0; (6)
respectively. The second-order conditions are satised. Let Ri(pj) (i = 0; 1; i 6= j) be the
reaction function of the one-shot game (stage game). From the above rst-order conditions,
we obtain
R0(p1) = c0 + (p1   c1); (7)
R1(p0) =
c1 + + p0   
2
: (8)
The equilibrium price, resulting prot of rm 1, and welfare are
pN0 =
   2 + 2c0   c1
2  2 ; (9)
pN1 =
   + c1 + c0   c12
2  2 ; (10)
1(p
N
0 ; p
N
1 ) =
(a1   a0)2
(1  2)(2  2)2 ; (11)
SW (pN0 ; p
N
1 ) =
(24   52 + 4)a20 + (4   32 + 3)  2(4   32 + 3)a0a1
2(1  2)(2  2)2 ; (12)
where the superscript N denotes one-shot Nash equilibrium.
Next, we consider collusion in the innitely repeated game. Both rms accept the gov-
ernment proposal (pC0 ; p
C
1 ) if the following two inequalities are satised.
SW (pC0 ; p
C
1 )
1    SW (R0(p
C
1 ); p
C
1 ) +
SW (pN0 ; q
N
1 )
1   ; (13)
1(p
C
0 ; p
C
1 )
1    1(p
C
0 ; R1(p
C
0 )) +
1(p
N
0 ; p
N
1 )
1   : (14)
5
Sustainable pairs of prices must not yield smaller welfare than that of the one-shot Nash
equilibrium because otherwise, the public rm never accepts them. Because the price of the
private rm at one-shot Nash equilibrium is too high for social welfare and that of the public
rm is optimal given pC1 , p
C
1  pN1 must hold.
Sustainable pairs of prices must not yield smaller prot in the private rm than that of
the one-shot Nash equilibrium because otherwise, the private rm never accepts them. Given
p0, p
C
1 (< p
N
1 ) yields smaller prot in rm 1 than that of the one-shot Nash equilibrium.
Thus, to compensate the private rm's prot, pC0 > p
N
0 must hold when p
C
1 < p
N
1 . These
lead to the following lemma (see Figure 1 for Lemma 1-ii).
Figure 1: Lemma 1-ii
Lemma 1 (i) (pC0 ; p
C
1 ) is sustainable only if p
C
0 > p
N
0 and p
C
1 < p
N
1 or (p
C
0 ; p
C
1 ) =
(pN0 ; p
N
1 ). (ii) If p
C
0 > p
N
0 and p
C
1 < p
N
1 , p
C
0 > R0(p
C
1 ) and p
C
1 < R1(p
C
0 ).
Lemma 1(i) presents a necessary (but not sucient) condition for sustainable prices.
Lemma 1(ii) states that rm 0 (res. rm 1) prefers a lower (res. higher) price than the
collusive price given the rival's price.
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3.2 Cournot case
First, we consider a competitive situation in which rms face a one-shot game. The rst-order
conditions of rms 0 and 1 are
@SW
@q0
= a0   q0   q1 = 0; (15)
@1
@q1
= a1   2q1   q0 = 0; (16)
respectively. The second-order conditions are satised. Let Ri(qj) (i = 0; 1; i 6= j) be the
reaction function of the one-shot game (stage game). From the above rst-order conditions,
we obtain
R0(q1) =
a0   q1

;
R1(q0) =
a1   q0
2
:
The equilibrium output, resulting prot of rm 1, and welfare are
qN0 =
2a0   a1
(2  2) ; (17)
qN1 =
a1   a0
(2  2) ; (18)
1(q
N
0 ; q
N
1 ) =
(a1   a0)2
(2  2)2 ; (19)
SW (qN0 ; q
N
1 ) =
(4  2)a20 + (3  2)a21   2(3  2)a0a1
2(2  2)2 : (20)
Next, we consider collusion in the innitely repeated game. Both rms accept the gov-
ernment proposal (qC0 ; q
C
1 ) if the following two inequalities are satised.
SW (qC0 ; q
C
1 )
1    SW (R0(q
C
1 ); q
C
1 ) +
SW (qN0 ; q
N
1 )
1   ; (21)
1(q
C
0 ; q
C
1 )
1    1(q
C
0 ; R1(q
C
0 )) +
1(q
N
0 ; q
N
1 )
1   : (22)
Similar discussions as for Lemma 1 lead to the following lemma.
Lemma 2 (qC0 ; q
C
1 ) is sustainable only if q
C
0 < q
N
0 and q
C
1 > q
N
1 or (q
C
0 ; q
C
1 ) = (q
N
0 ; q
N
1 ):
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Lemma 2 presents a necessary but not sucient condition for sustainable outputs. The
private (public) rm increases (decreases) its output expecting that the public (private) rm
decreases (increases) its output.
3.3 Comparison
Before presenting the main results, we present a well-known result in the literature.9
Result 1 1(p
N
0 ; p
N
1 ) > 1(q
N
0 ; q
N
1 ) and SW (p
N
0 ; p
N
1 ) > SW (q
N
0 ; q
N
1 ).
In contrast to a private oligopoly, Bertrand competition yields larger prot in the private
rm when the rival rm is a welfare maximizer.
We now present our main results. As mentioned in Subsection 3.1, the price of the
private rm is too high for social welfare, and the government wants to decrease it. Thus,
the government sets pC1 < p
N
1 . It sets p
C
0 > p
N
0 because otherwise, rm 1 never accepts the
collusion.
Although we cannot solve the optimal pCi and q
C
i explicitly, we derive a key property of
the collusion. We show that the deviation incentive from the collusion is greater under the
quantity case than under the price case, in contrast to the case of prot-maximizing collusion
among prot-maximizing rms.
Proposition 1 Suppose that pCi =    qCi   qCj : Suppose that pC0 > pN0 and pC1 < pN1 .
Then SW (R0(p
C
1 ); p
C
1 ) < SW (R0(q
C
1 ); q
C
1 ) and 1(p
C
0 ; R1(p
C
0 )) < 1(q
C
0 ; R1(q
C
0 )).
Proof Let pD1 := R1(p
C
0 ), and let q
D
i be the resulting output of rm i when (p0; p1) =
(pC0 ; p
D
1 ). Consider the Cournot case. Suppose that rm 1 deviates from the collusion
and chooses q1 = q
D
1 given q0 = q
C
0 . Its prot is 1(q
C
0 ; q
D
1 ). Because q
D
1 6= R1(qC0 ),
1(q
C
0 ; q
D
1 ) < 1(q
C
0 ; R1(q
C
0 )):
From Lemma 1(ii) we obtain pD1 > p
C
1 : We obtain q
D
0 > q
C
0 because q0 is increasing in p1.
Because 1(q0; q1) is decreasing in q0, 1(q
C
0 ; q
D
1 ) > 1(q
D
0 ; q
D
1 ) = 1(p
D
0 ; p
C
1 ): These imply
that 1(p
C
0 ; R1(p
C
0 )) < 1(q
C
0 ; R1(q
C
0 )).
9See Ghosh and Mitra (2010).
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A similar principle applies to the deviation incentive for rm 0. 
We explain the intuition behind the result that the one-shot gain of the deviation is
greater in the Cournot case than in the Bertrand case. If the private rm were to maximize
current prot and not care about future prots, it would raise its price in the Bertrand case
and reduce its output in the Cournot case. In the Bertrand case, the rival's price is given
exogenously. Thus, the deviation increases the resulting output of the rival and is harmful for
the private rm. By contrast, in the Cournot case, the rival's output is given exogenously,
and thus, the abovementioned harmful eect does not exist. Therefore, the private rm
obtains a larger prot from the deviation in the Cournot case.
If the public rm were to maximize current welfare and not care about future welfare, it
would reduce its price in the Bertrand case and increase its output in the Cournot case. In
the Bertrand case, the rival's price is given exogenously. Thus, the deviation decreases the
resulting output of the rival and is harmful for welfare. By contrast, in the Cournot case,
the rival's output is given exogenously, and thus, the abovementioned harmful eect does
not exist. Therefore, the public rm has a stronger incentive to deviate in the Cournot case,
too.
Proposition 1 is in sharp contrast to the result in private oligopolies, in which one-shot
gain of the deviation from a joint-prot-maximizing collusion is greater in the Bertrand case
than in the Cournot case (Deneckere 1983, Gibbons, 1992).
Next, we investigate welfare implications. The following results state that Bertrand
competition yields greater welfare than Cournot competition does when  is suciently
small (Proposition 2)10, while the opposite result is obtained when  is suciently large
(Proposition 3).11
Proposition 2 If  is close to 0, Bertrand competition yields greater welfare than Cournot
10This result does not depends on the assumption of grim trigger strategy because we use only Proposition
1 to derive this result.
11In the case of prot-maximizing collusion among private rms, both types of competition yield the same
economic welfare when  is suciently large because both yield the monopoly outcome.
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competition.
Proof Suppose that  is suciently close to 0. Suppose that (qC0 ; q
C
1 ) is sustainable and
yields greater welfare than SW (pN0 ; p
N
1 ). Because the deviation incentive is stronger under
Cournot competition (Proposition 1), (pC0 ; p
C
1 ) := (  qC0   qC1 ;   qC1   qC0 ) must
be sustainable under Bertrand competition. Thus, Cournot competition never yields greater
welfare than Bertrand competition.
Suppose that (pC0 ; p
C
1 ) := (   qC0   qC1 ;    qC1   qC0 ) is sustainable and yields
the greatest welfare among the sustainable outcomes. Then, either (13) or (14) is satised
with equality because otherwise, a slight decrease in p1 improves welfare, ensuring that (13)
and (14) are satised. Under these conditions, (qC0 ; q
C
1 ) must not be sustainable because
the deviation incentive is stronger under Cournot competition for both rms and either (21)
or (22) is not satised. Thus, Bertrand competition can yield strictly greater welfare than
Cournot. 
Proposition 3 If  is close to 1, Cournot competition yields greater welfare than Bertrand
competition.
Proof Suppose that  is suciently close to 1. Suppose that (pC0 ; p
C
1 ) := (   qC0  
qC1 ;   qC1   qC0 ) is sustainable and yields greater welfare than SW (pN0 ; pN1 ). Because
the punishment for the deviation is more severe under Cournot competition (Result 1),
(qC0 ; q
C
1 ) must be sustainable under Cournot competition. Thus, Cournot competition never
yields greater welfare than Bertrand competition.
Suppose that (qC0 ; q
C
1 ) is sustainable and yields the greatest welfare among the sustainable
outcomes. Then, either (21) or (22) is satised with equality because otherwise, a slight
increase in q1 improves welfare, ensuring that (21) and (22) are satised. Under these
conditions, (pC0 ; p
C
1 ) := (  qC0   qC1 ;   qC1   qC0 ) must not be sustainable because
the punishment for the deviation is more severe under Cournot competition and either (13)
or (14) is not satised. Thus, Cournot competition can yield strictly greater welfare than
Bertrand competition. 
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On one hand, the deviation incentive is stronger under Cournot (Proposition 1) and
this makes the collusion less stable. Therefore, it is more dicult for the government to
form welfare-improving collusion under Cournot competition and this is harmful for welfare.
On the other hand, the punishment eect is stricter under Cournot competition and this
makes the collusion more stable. Therefore, it is easier for the government to form welfare-
improving collusion under Cournot competition and this is benecial for welfare. The former
eect dominates when  is small, while the latter eect dominates when  is large. This leads
to Propositions 2 and 3.
4 Concluding Remarks
In this study, we discuss welfare-improving collusion in mixed duopolies. We nd that the
deviation incentive is stronger under Cournot competition than under Bertrand competition.
This leads the government to form welfare-improving collusion more easily under Bertrand
competition, and thus, Bertrand competition can yield greater welfare. However, in a mixed
duopoly, competition is more severe, and thus, the punishment for deviation is stricter under
Cournot competition. This leads the government to form collusion more easily under Cournot
competition, and thus, Cournot competition can yield greater welfare. The latter eect
outweighs the former eect when the discount factor is large, and thus, Cournot competition
is better for social welfare when rms are suciently patient.
In this study, we assume that a private rm is domestic. In the literature on mixed
oligopolies, ownership of the private rm often matters12 Our results, however, hold when
the private rm is foreign. In this sense, our results are robust.
Our results may be dependent on the assumption of duopoly. As Haraguchi and Mat-
sumura (2016) showed, Bertrand competition yields larger prot than Cournot competition
as long as the number of private rms is equal to or smaller than four. However, they showed
that Bertrand competition may yield smaller prot than Cournot competition if the num-
12See the literature starting with Corneo and Jeanne (1994) and Fjell and Pal (1996). See also Fjell and
Heywood (2002), Ogawa and Sanjo (2007), Heywood and Ye (2007), and Cato and Matsumura (2015).
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ber of private rms is equal to or larger than ve, and always yields larger prot when the
number of private rms is suciently large. Thus, if the number of private rms is large,
the punishment eect becomes stricter under Bertrand competition for each private rm,
whereas it remains weaker for the public rm, and therefore, the result becomes ambiguous.
Moreover, if the number of private rms is suciently large, on one hand, it is more dicult
to form collusion under both Bertrand and Cournot cases, and on the other hand, the wel-
fare gain of collusion is small because competition yields an outcome close to the rst-best
outcome. Thus, in such a case, it might not be natural to discuss such welfare-improving
collusion.13
13By contrast, in prot-maximizing collusion, the prot gain of collusion is greater when the number of
rms is larger because more severe competition yields smaller prots.
12
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